With this paper, we survey the research performed in the domain of browser
fingerprinting, while providing an accessible entry point to newcomers in the
field. We explain how this technique works and where it stems from. We analyze
the related work in detail to understand the composition of modern fingerprints
and see how this technique is currently used online. We systematize existing
defense solutions into different categories and detail the current challenges
yet to overcome.

This post presents a crawl of the top Alexa 500K to study the use and the diversity of the canvas fingerprints on the web.

Because of their side effects, browser fingerprinting countermeasures may have a negative impact on users privacy. In this post we look more in details at Canvas Defender, a canvas fingerprinting countermeasure.

Finally, one of the major browsers is doing something about canvas fingerprinting

As part of the Tor uplift project, we are going to implement anti-fingerprinting protection [1] in Firefox.

This bug is used as the meta bug of all anti-fingerprinting features.

Reference:
[1] Cross-Origin Fingerprinting Unlinkability
https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#fingerprinting-linkability

Fluxfonts is a specialized tool that attempts to tackle the privacy concerns raised by the possibility to collect information about the fonts installed on a system. Such information can be used to uniquely identify a system. With Fluxfonts, new fonts are randomly created and removed to prevent the same fingerprint from being recreated.

Font fingerprinting is a technique which is difficult and usually inconvenient for users to circumvent by other means. Fluxfonts is fully automated and runs in the background. By effectively always having a new unique fingerprint, it should prevent a system from being (re‐)identified between applications and web sites/‐browsers.